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Abstract
This paper models aid agencies as financial intermediaries that do not make
a financial return to depositors, whose concern is to transfer resources to
investor-beneficiaries. This leads to a problem of verifying that the agency is
using donations as intended. One solution to this problem is for an agency
to employ altruistic workers at below-market wages: altruistic workers, who
can monitor the agency’s activities, would not work at below-market rates
unless it were genuinely transferring resources to beneficiaries. We consider
conditions for this solution to be incentive compatible. In a model with
pure moral hazard, observability of wages makes incorporation as a not-for-
profit firm redundant as a commitment device. In a model with both moral
hazard and adverse selection, incorporation as a not-for-profit firm can serve
as a costly commitment mechanism reassuring donors against misuse of their
funds. Hiring a worker of low ability can also be a valuable commitment
device against fraud.
Key words : signalling, non-profit, wage differential, donations, altruism,
two-sided market
JEL classification numbers : D210, D640, J310, L310
The aid agencies themselves in this difficult environment do not
have much incentive to achieve results, since the results are mostly
unobservable. . . . Virtually all observers of aid agencies agree
that they allocate too little effort either to insuring that loan
conditions were actually observed or to later evaluation of loan
effectiveness. . . . Aid agencies face a peculiar incentive problem:
they spend one group of people’s money on a different group of
people. The intended beneficiaries have almost no voice in how
the money is spent. (Easterly (2003))
1 Introduction
Aid agencies, like banks, connect finance with projects. We can therefore
think of aid agencies as a kind of financial intermediary, albeit of a rather
special kind. Two things in particular make them special. First, unlike in
the case of banks, it is not typically expected that any share of a project’s
returns be returned to its financiers. This makes it difficult for donors to
assess the efficiency of their intermediary: while the interest rate a bank of-
fers to depositors can be compared to those of other banks, donors to an aid
agency have no immediately observable signal of the results of the agency’s
intermediation activity. Secondly, even if alternative signals of project re-
turns are available (such as audited accounting data), one characteristic of
an aid project is that its true social returns may not be fully or even partially
captured in flows of finance, either because the project generates externalities
that are not easily appropriable or because the value of such financial flows
as are generated consists chiefly in their accruing to poor individuals whose
weight in a social welfare function is high.
Not all intermediary organizations need to worry about providing signals
between the individuals on the two sides of their market. Some intermedi-
aries, such as dating agencies, exist to put individuals in contact with each
other; once this has been done the contact itself provides the signal. Other
organizations also act as intermediaries between a donor and a distant recip-
ient without necessarily providing feedback to the donor. Postal services and
florists generally do not, except at a higher price, inform donors when their
orders have been delivered. In these cases, however, the donor and recipient
may already know each other, and have their own channels for providing
feedback.
Aid agencies, however, face the same predicament of distance and anonymity
as financial institutions like banks, but without the feedback signal available
to banks. This paper addresses the question of how aid agencies manage to
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signal quality to potential donors. In doing so, it attempts to exploit the styl-
ised facts that such agencies are typically incorporated as non-profits (NPs),
and their professional staff may be paid at below market wages. The role of
the former observation has already been explored in the literature: Glaeser
and Shleifer (2001) and related papers assume that it is more expensive for
those in charge of a NP to appropriate its resources (as they are required to
do so through perks) than it is for those in charge of a for-profit (FP), since
the latter may use dividends or other cash payouts. Thus, NP status imposes
an inefficiency that weakens the incentives to appropriate the organization’s
resources for private gain.1
This paper’s contribution lies in its development of the second observa-
tion. Before explaining how we do so, we review the empirical literature. In
brief, early findings of wage discounts for employees of US domestic NPs (e.g.
hospitals, universities, etc.) seem to disappear when self-selection, hours of
work, etc. are controlled for. As a whole, however, this literature has not
studied the fully two-sided markets of interest to us, in which the possibili-
ties for feedback between donor and recipient are negligible. There is some
empirical, and much anecdotal, evidence that a NP wage discount exists in
this sector.
Handy and Katz (1998) report results suggesting that “nonprofits tend to
pay their managers a lower wage than [do] for-profits”. The results on which
they report are drawn from US NP organizations.2 Their explanations for
lower wages for professionals appeal to two factors: trust is more important
in the environments in which they work, which are marked by asymmetric
information; and managers may self-select on the basis of personality traits.
Mocan and Tekin (2003) argue, instead, that “the empirical evidence on
the nonprofit wage differential is ambiguous. Most of this ambiguity seems to
stem from inadequate data sets”. In contrast, they control for self-selection
into the child care sector in four US states as well as for unobserved worker
heterogeneity. Doing so, they find wage premia associated with NPs: “non-
profit compensation differential is 8% for full-time workers and 10% for part-
time workers.” They note theoretical arguments for premia and for discounts:
NP managers may ‘capture’ the organization, and reward themselves more
highly; NP managers may derive more job satisfaction from ‘doing good’,
and require less pay.
An addition theoretical argument for NP wage premia is provided by
1FPs can, of course, write constitutions prohibiting such disbursals.
2Preston (1989) include “hospitals; health services; [schools and universities]; libraries;
museums, art galleries, and zoos; religious organizations; welfare services; residential wel-
fare facilities; and nonprofit membership organizations” - but not aid agencies. Frank
(1996) does not indicate how it classified employers a FP, NP or government.
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Franc¸ois (2003). He considers workers who receive utility from the level of
provision of a public good: they do not care how that good is provided,
thus their utility is not of what is sometimes called the ‘warm glow’ kind,
namely dependent on the character of their own involvement in the desired
outcome. Effort can be induced in one of two ways: a supervision technology
which solves the moral hazard problem at a fixed cost; or a contract paying a
wage premium if the contracted effort is supplied, firing the worker otherwise.
Under the latter, the managers of FPs are induced to supply more remedial
effort if the worker shirks: they care not just about the effect of shirking on
the level of public good provision, but also on their profits. Inverting the
usual story, the costs of shirking in a NP are greater: not just loss of an
efficiency wage, but a greater reduction in the public good. The efficiency
wage paid by NPs is therefore less than that required of FPs, causing the FPs
to be competed out of the sectors that do not use the supervision technology.
Therefore NPs will predominate in the sectors that pay a wage premium.
Note, however, that controlling for the production technology and for effort
levels, workers in NPs are still being paid less than those in FPs would be
paid for doing strictly identical work, even if actual empirical data might not
make it possible to control accurately for these differences.
Ruhm and Borkoski (2002) study the US Current Population Survey Out-
going Rotation Groups and survey the literature. They find no strong evi-
dence of ‘labour donation’.
In the developmental context, Reinikka and Svensson (2004) estimate
the relative behaviour of health care providers in Uganda. They find that
religious NPs pay their medical staff at below market rates, but are more
likely to provide pro-poor and public health care, charging lower rates for
similar levels of (observable) quality.
Somewhat further afield, Buraschi and Cornelli (2003) study donations to
the English National Opera. Donations seem to be motivated by a perception
that the donor is pivotal to providing a production funded by the donations.
Our own model supposes that donors to an aid agency cannot observe
directly the quality of the agency’s work. However, they can observe the
remuneration enjoyed by the agency’s employees. This need not be inter-
preted literally as an observation of the wage itself: remuneration may be
non-pecuniary. For example, as monks may take vows of poverty, charities
may visibly forgo luxury. Thus, most generally, we allows donors to observe
some data on overheads. This figures appear both in annual reports and
are frequently cited by charities when fund-raising. From these data, donors
draw inferences about the uses to which the charities are putting the funds
that they cannot observe. The question is whether signals, such as wages
and organisational form choice, are reliable in equilibrium.
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We consider a one period world in which there are three, potentially sim-
ilar agents: workers, who may be selfish or altruistic, founders, who may also
be selfish or altruistic, and donors, who are always altruistic. By altruistic
we simply mean that they care about the results of the agency’s actions (this
is not the same as a ‘mission’ in the sense of Besley and Ghatak (2003),
since the utility is a function of equilibrium outcomes rather than the type of
the organization). The objective functions of altruistic agents are additively
separable in consumption and the altruistic component; this second term is
omitted from those of selfish agents.
The founder (principal) hires a worker (agent) to manage projects on her
behalf. The worker then performs two types of project for the principal:
actual development work in a poor locale, and fund-raising and management
in a wealthy one. His ability determines the efficiency with which he carries
these tasks out.
The organization receives income only from donations. Its founder splits
that income between development aid, wages to the worker, and perks (or
profits, in the case of a FP) to herself. As altruistic workers receive utility
from their involvement in development work, they may be paid a lower wage
than selfish workers for a given level of such work.
A representative donor imperfectly observes the organization’s records.
Thus, he may not observe the types of either the founder (i.e. altruistic or
selfish) or the worker (again, altruistic or selfish, but now also high ability
or low ability). Neither, as he is not ‘in the field’, may he observe the
actual level of development work done. Finally, as he does not observe the
founder’s personal behaviour, he cannot observe the perks that she takes
from the organization, though he can observe the organization’s type - that
is, whether it is a for profit or a not-for-profit firm.
Therefore, this is a model of ‘small’ donors - the charitably-inclined public:
in reality, large institutional donors may be able to insist on more detailed
information about the agency’s activities. Small donors cannot bargain with
the agency but have to accept the signal that the agency chooses to provide.
Thus, donors may only observe the worker’s wages. If they also observe
the worker’s type, they can infer from the wages of an altruistic worker what
level of development work the organization undertakes. However, if types
are not observable, donors may be unable to infer the level of development
work from the wage. For instance, a comparatively low wage might indicate
that a high ability worker is willing to work for a wage well below his outside
option because of the high level of development work the organization is
doing. Alternatively, it might indicate that the worker is of low ability and
the organization is doing only moderate levels of development work.
In Section 2 we present a model with pure moral hazard: the founder
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is observed to be either purely selfish, or to have an altruistic motive as
well. The founder’s actions, however, may not be observable. We thus con-
sider the employment of altruistic workers purely as a commitment device
against moral hazard. We show that in these circumstances there is no role
for incorporation as a not-for-profit firm as a commitment mechanism: it is
true that, when founded by altrusitic founders, not-for-profit firms undertake
higher levels of development work than do for-profit firms, but the cost of
the signal is too high given that there is an alternative signal available in
the form of the wage. Section 3 introduces adverse selection, in which nei-
ther founders’ nor worker’s types are observable in equilibrium - we consider
the incentive constraints that must be satisfied in a separating to occur in
equilibrium. The double character of the adverse selection problem makes
it difficult to find analytic solutions with full generality, because of counter-
vailing incentives: in Section 4 we solve for particular specifications of the
utility and cost functions, finding conditions for separating equilibria to ex-
ist, and showing the relative roles of signalling via wages and signalling via
not-for-profit status. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The model with pure model hazard
The model considers three agents, a donor, a founder and a worker. The
founder moves first, making a wage offer to a single worker from a compet-
itive labour market to carry out the work of an ostensibly charitable orga-
nization, which may be established either as a profit or as a not-for-profit
firm. The donor, who moves last after observing the worker’s wage and the
organization’s form, is the organization’s sole source of funding.
The donor is endowed with a single unit of wealth. In addition to car-
ing about his own consumption, he is altruistically motivated. Thus, his
objective function is
uD = g (1− d) + h (d · t) ; (1)
where d ∈ [0, 1] is the donation and t is the fraction of d spent on development
work by the organization. Thus, the donor’s altruism is ‘results oriented’.
The functions g (·) and h (·) satisfy:
g (0) = h (0) = 0; (2)
g′ (0) = h′ (0) =∞; (3)
g′ (x) , h′ (x) > 0∀x ∈ [0, 1] ; (4)
g′′ (x) , h′′ (x) < 0∀x ∈ [0, 1] . (5)
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The founder is either motivated in the same way that the donor is, or is
purely selfishly motivated. Both possibilities are incorporated in the general
objective function,
uF = g (f · k) + αFh (d · t) ; (6)
where f indicates the organization’s form (i.e. for profit or non-profit), k
are the organization’s profits and αF ∈ {0, 1} indexes the founder’s level of
altruism. In this section, we assume that αF is common knowledge, though
in the following section we shall relax this assumption.
Our altruistic founders therefore correspond to the default case in Glaeser
and Shleifer (2001). Their founders care not only about profits but also about
the (expensive) quality of their products.
The founder makes two types of decisions: those observable by the donor,
and those hidden from him. In the first category are the form of her organi-
zation and the wage that she pays her worker. In the latter is t, the share
of donations spent upon development work. In the model of pure moral haz-
ard presented in this section, we assume that the worker’s characteristics are
observed by the donor.
The choice of organizational form, f ∈ {ρ, 1}, determines the efficiency
with which the organization’s profits can be transformed into income for the
founder. Founding an FP is equivalent to setting f = 1 while founding a NP
sets f = ρ ∈ (0, 1), with ρ a parameter determined outside the model by the
rigour of the regulation of the NP sector.
The worker is capable of purely selfish (αW = 0) or altruistic (αW = 1)
motivation, but may also be either high ability (θ = 0) or low ability (θ = 1).
High ability workers implement projects and raise and manage funds more
efficiently. In the model of pure moral hazard presented in this section, both
αW and θ are observed by the donor.
To simplify exposition, we assume that the altruistic component of her
objective function is a function of t and not of d.t, as follows:
uW = g (w) + αWh (t) ; (7)
where w is her worker’s wage. Technically, this simplifies calculations by
removing the solution to the donor’s problem, d, from the worker’s.3 Eco-
nomically, an altruistic worker is not motivated by results but by ‘purity’,
the total proportion of its donations directed towards development. As the
agent responsible for implementing the organization’s work, she observes the
transfer share set by the founder.
3Making the worker’s altruism utility a function of both d and t adds technical com-
plications without changing qualitative results.
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As the worker is hired from a competitive labour market, and as her
type is observed by the donor, her wage leaves her no rents. When the
worker is selfish, her wage is forced down to her outside option. These satisfy
1 > w¯ > w > 0, with the high ability worker’s outside wage exceeding the
low ability’s. The upper bound ensures that it is feasible to hire a selfish,
high ability worker under the most permissive conditions (i.e. when d = 1).
When the worker is altruistic, she will be driven below her outside wage
option by an organization setting t > 0, thereby paying her in altruism utility.
Therefore:
w (αW , θ, t) =

w ifαW = 0, θ = 1
w¯ ifαW = 0, θ = 0
max {0, g−1 (g (w)− h (t))} ifαW = 1, θ = 1
max {0, g−1 (g (w¯)− h (t))} ifαW = 1, θ = 0
 . (8)
Thus, for sufficiently high levels of t, the worker could earn rents even by
working for free. We would not normally expect to see this occur in equi-
librium as the Inada conditions on consumption utility make it prohibitively
expensive for the founder to hold the worker to a zero wage (except in the
extreme case where ρ is close to zero) .
From the assumptions on the utility function it follows straightforwardly
that for every t ∈ [0, 1],
w (0, 0, t) ≥ w (1, 0, t) > w (1, 1, t) . (9)
Thus, competitive wages display both ability premia and altruism discounts.
2.1 The donor’s problem
The donor maximises equation 1 by choice of d ∈ [0, 1]. As his objective
function depends on the transfer set by the founder, he seeks to infer t even
though he cannot observe it directly. Observing the worker’s type makes this
straightforward: as the terms in wage equation 8 are invertible, observing the
wage allows t to be inferred.
The following lemmas establish conditions for d (t) to be well-behaved -
that is, an increasing concave function of t.
Lemma 1. In an equilibrium of the pure moral hazard model, donations are
positive if and only if the transfer, t, is as well.
The proof is in Appendix A. Intuitively, if the founder makes no transfer,
no donation yields the donor any altruism utility. As the donor’s marginal
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utility of altruism is infinite at this point, so will be his marginal donation.
This helps ensure an interior solution in donations, something also proven in
the appendix.
In what follows, we assume that the coefficient of relative risk aversion in
altruism be bounded below unity:
−xh
′′ (x)
h′ (x)
< 1∀x ∈ [0, 1] . (10)
Lemma 2. Inequality 10 is a necessary and sufficient condition for donations
to increase over t ∈ [0, 1].
Again, the proof is relegated to Appendix A. The condition is intuitive:
it states that the donor’s marginal utility of altruism must not decrease so
fast that the income effect outweighs the substitution effect of increases in t.
If it did, increases in t would cause the donor’s marginal utility of altruism
to fall to an extent that led the donor to wish to take more of his utility
through consumption, thus reducing d. In what follows we assume that this
upper bound on relative risk aversion holds. Thus, the maximum donation
occurs when t = 1. Denote this by d¯.4
When inequality 10 holds with equality, the donations function is linear.
2.2 The founder’s problem
The founder maximises equation 6 subject to the budget constraint
d = k + w + d · t+ c (θ (1 + t) d) ; (11)
where c (·) indicates management costs.5 These depend on two elements: the
worker’s ability and the volume of work to be performed by her. This, in
turn, has two components: raising and managing the donation, d, and then
implementing the development project, d · t. These two tasks are treated
symmetrically, so that the volume of work is their sum, (1 + t) d.
4Implicitly, d¯ is defined by g′
(
1− d¯) = h′ (d¯).
5Strictly speaking these are ‘wastage costs’ - costs over and above the efficient mini-
mum costs necessary to manage a portfolio of a given size. This is because we normalise
the cost function to zero for a high-ability worker. The net cost of the worker to the firm
is not invariant between worker types (that is, the wage does not adjust to their differ-
ential productivity) because of the assumption that wages are set in a competitive labor
market - thus, relative wages are determined by relative outside options, not by relative
productivities within the firm.
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For simplicity, assume that the θ = 0 (high ability) worker, induces no
management costs. Otherwise, they are convex and increasing in their argu-
ments. Thus, the management cost function satisfies:
c ∈ C2;
c (0) = 0;
c′ (0) = 0;
c′′ (x) > 0∀x ∈ [0, 1] ; and
c′ (2) ≤ 1. (12)
The final inequality bears explanation. We wish to assume that costs never
rise so quickly that a larger donation could leave a founder worse off. Thus,
we wish the marginal management cost of donations to be less than unity;
with convex costs, this need only hold at their maximal argument, (1 + t) d.
Thus, imposing it at 2 is conservative but avoids conditions on endogenous
variables.
Finally, we assume that low ability workers cost enough to matter to
founders but not so much that they would not be employed even by an
organization undertaking no development work. That is, for high enough
donation and development levels an low ability worker will cost the founder
more in wastage than he saves her in wage costs, but for a firm receiving only
donations and undertaking no development, low ability workers are better
value.
c
(
2d¯
)
> w (1, 0, 1)− w (1, 1, 1) > c (d¯) (13)
Were this not the case, low ability altruistic workers would be cheaper than
high ability altruists, or vice versa, for all levels of t ∈ [0, 1].
Substituting budget constraint 11, wage function 8 and donation function
29 into objective function 6 yields the founder’s maximand:
uF = g (f [(1− t) d− c (θ (1 + t) d)− w (αW , θ, t)]) + αFh (d · t) . (14)
Unfortunately, this is not in general concave in the transfer share. While
the primitives g (·) , h (·) and −c (·), are all concave, their combination may
not be. Intuitively, the founder’s choice of t not only has a direct effect on
her utility but also two or three indirect effects. Directly, higher t leaves the
founder a smaller share of the donation pie to consume herself - a negative ef-
fect. The first indirect effect is in donations: higher t induces more donations
- a positive effect. The second is a wage effect: higher t allows altruistic work-
ers to be retained at a lower wage, also a positive effect. The combination
of these two positive effects may violate concavity. The third indirect effect
is only experienced by employers of low ability workers: increased t, and
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the consequent increase in donations d (t), induce more management costs, a
negative effect. Finally, when founders are altruistic, there is a fourth utility
effect of changes in t: a direct, positive altruism effect. They experience a
direct utility gain from increases in the proportion of their budget spent on
development.
However, even without establishing concavity we can still show a number
of results that must hold at any maximum. First, we show a simple relation
between the share of transfers chosen by the founder and the employment
decision:
Lemma 3. There is a unique share of transfers, τ , such that, if the equi-
librium transfer share exceeds τ it involves a high ability, altruistic worker;
otherwise, an low ability, altruistic worker is used.
See Appendix A for the proof. Again, the intuition is straightforward.
When little development work is undertaken, the high ability worker’s higher
base wage, w¯, outweighs her management cost savings. Thus, it is more
efficient to hire an low ability worker. The same argument holds in reverse
for high levels of development work. Finally, only altruists are hired as they
reduce the wage bill without adding costs for all positive t.
We now present results on the transfers undertaken by selfish and altru-
istic founders.
Lemma 4. In an equilibrium of the pure moral hazard model, an altruistic
founder sets a higher transfer share than does a selfish founder. In both cases,
the share lies strictly between zero and one.
The proof (in Appendix A) has a simple intuition. At whatever transfer
share solves the selfish founder’s problem, say t∗0, the altruistic founder still
experiences positive marginal utility to transfers. Thus, she will increase her
transfer to t∗1.
The transfer shares are interior as, at the extremes, the Inada conditions
are encountered: at t = 0, no donations are received; at t = 1, maximal
donations are received, but nothing is left for consumption utility. Thus,
profits, k, are also interior in equilibrium.
Theorem 1. In an equilibrium of the pure moral hazard model, the transfer
share set by a selfish founder, t∗0, is independent of the organizational form
of the agency.
This may be seen by inspecting maximand 14. When αF = 0, the founder
maximises the argument of the square bracketed term. This is independent
of f .
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This is not the case for altruistic founders. As in Glaeser and Shleifer
(2001), the founder’s choice of organizational form matters: f does not cancel
out of the first order conditions.
Theorem 2. When the coefficient of relative risk aversion in money is
bounded below unity, so that
−xg
′′ (x)
g′ (x)
< 1∀x ∈ [0, 1] ; (15)
altruistic founders of non-profits decrease t∗1 as ρ increases.
This result seems intuitive: more stringent regulatory requirements on
NPs induce their founders to spend a higher share of donations on develop-
ment aid, provided once again that the income effect does not outweigh the
substitution effect (which would occur if the utility function were too concave
in consumption). This is because such regulatory requirements raise the cost
of using donations for perks relative to using them for development.
When Theorem 2 holds, an altruistic founder sets a lower t, thereby
inducing a lower d, when she founds a FP than when she founds an NP.
Nevertheless, she prefers to optimise with f = 1 than with f = ρ < 1. This
result is unsurprising given that her altruism is observable: as the worker’s
wage is doing all the signalling required, further signalling with organizational
form choice is unnecessary.
As this argument also holds for selfish founders, we may conclude:
Theorem 3. If a founder’s altruism is observable, no founder incorporates
as an a non-profit.
Similarly, full information rules out advertising in Milgrom and Roberts
(1986). However, as we shall see below, the choice of organizational form may
indeed matter for signalling when the founder’s altruism is not observable.
We consider this now.
In Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) the only type of founder corresponded to
our altruistic, given her concern for quality. However, they did not allow sig-
nalling by wages. Thus, in their environment, signalling with organizational
form is relevant. In our case, with observable wages, founders find them to
be cheaper signals.
3 Adding adverse selection
In this section, we add an adverse selection problem to the donor’s problem.
Now, he cannot observe either the founder’s type or the worker’s ability
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level.6 The problem is now a ‘general principal-agent problem’ (Myerson,
1982), combining adverse selection with moral hazard.
As previously, the founder’s choice of organizational form, f , and wage,
w, are observable to the donor, while the transfer share, t, is not. Now,
however, the donor cannot observe types either. Thus, he does not initially
know the founder’s altruism, αF , the worker’s, αW , or the worker’s ability, θ.
The donor again waits for the founder’s decisions before setting d.7
We look for Perfect Bayesian equilibria.8 We denote the equilibrium
choices of a selfish founder by a 0 subscript and those of an altruistic one by
a 1 subscript. If f0 6= f1, we say that the equilibrium displays organizational
separation. If w0 ≡ w (αF0, θ0, t0) 6= w1 ≡ w (αF1, θ1, t1), we say that the
equilibrium displays wage separation. While the former generally implies the
latter, the converse is not true.
As we focus on separating equilibria, we need only consider pure strate-
gies: if more than one action were in the support of a separating equilibrium,
which earned the founder some donation, she would only ever take the least
cost action.
As usual, analysis proceeds by writing incentive compatibility (IC) con-
straints for both founder types. A separating equilibrium arises if both
founder types derive higher utility from honest behaviour than they do from
fraud. As the donor knows neither the founder’s nor the worker’s type, there
are three forms of fraud to consider:
1. pure θ-fraud, whereby the donor mistakenly infers the worker’s type
(but not the founder’s). Denote the unobservable transfer shares and
worker types hired by a tilde.
2. pure α-fraud, whereby the donor mistakenly infers the founder’s type
(but not the worker’s.).
3. αθ-fraud, whereby the donor mistakenly infers both types. Denote the
unobservable transfer shares and worker types hired by a caret.
Not knowing the worker’s type ex ante prevents the donor, upon observing
a wage, inverting the relevant wage schedule to retrieve the transfer share, t.
6Only altruistic workers will be hired: for any founder setting t ≥ 0 they are weakly
cheaper without any productivity or signalling disadvantages. When t > 0, this is strictly
so.
7If the problem were one of screening rather than signalling, the donor would initially
set contracts, which the founders could take or leave (Armstrong and Rochet, 1999).
Jullien, Salanie´, and Salanie´ (2003) analysed the generalised agency case.
8With two periods and two types, PBE is equivalent to sequential equilibrium.
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Instead, he must attempt to deduce both which wage schedule is the relevant
one, and whether the worker is being held to her schedule.
Figure 1 illustrates the problem. The two decreasing functions represent
the wage schedules for the high ability and low ability workers. The increasing
function represents the management cost induced by an low ability worker.
Thus, the thickened parts of the wage schedules reflect the efficient worker
choice under pure moral hazard: a high ability worker is hired if and only
if t ≥ τ . It may therefore be seen that there is a range of wages consistent
with two transfer shares:
w (1, 1, t) = w (1, 0, t¯) . (16)
-
6
t
w
1
w (1, 0, t)
w (1, 1, t)
.........................................................................................
........................................
t¯t
....................................................
τ
c ((1 + t) d (t))
Figure 1: Multiple transfers consistent with a single wage
We now write the founders’ IC and individual rationality constraints with
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maximal generality. The selfish founder’s constraints are:
f0 [(1− t0) d (te (f0, w0))− c (θ0 (1 + t0) d (te (f0, w0)))− w0] (17)
≥ max
{
f0
[(
1− t˜0
)
d (te (f0, w0))− c
(
θ˜0
(
1 + t˜0
)
d (te (f0, w0))
)
− w0
]
,
(18)
f1 [(1− t1) d (te (f1, w1))− c (θ1 (1 + t1) d (te (f1, w1)))− w1] (19)
f1
[(
1− tˆ0
)
d (te (f1, w1))− c
(
θˆ0
(
1 + tˆ0
)
d (te (f1, w1))
)
− w1
]
(20)
0} ; (21)
where te (·) indicates the transfer inferred by the donor on the basis of ob-
servable variables. The optimal deviations considered on the right hand side
are pure θ-fraud, pure α-fraud and αθ-fraud, respectively. Inequality 21 is
the IR constraint.
The altruistic founder’s constraints are:
g (f1 [(1− t1) d (te (f1, w1))− c (θ1 (1 + t1) d (te (f1, w1)))− w1]) + h (d (te (f1, w1)) t1)
(22)
≥ max
{
g
(
f1
[(
1− t˜1
)
d (te (f1, w1))− c
(
θ˜1
(
1 + t˜1
)
d (te (f1, w1))
)
− w1
])
+ h
(
d (te (f1, w1)) t˜1
)
,
(23)
g (f0 [(1− t0) d (te (f0, w0))− c (θ0 (1 + t0) d (te (f0, w0)))− w0]) + h (d (te (f0, w0)) t0) ,
(24)
g
(
f0
[(
1− tˆ1
)
d (te (f0, w0))− c
(
θˆ1
(
1 + tˆ1
)
d (te (f0, w0))
)
− w0
])
+ h
(
d (te (f0, w0)) tˆ1
)
,
(25)
0} . (26)
Thus, neither founder may ‘half-misrepresent’ her type by adopting only
some of the other founder’s observable choices. Doing so would not disguise
herself as the other type but would, instead, reveal to the donor that she is
engaged in fraud.
At this stage, analysis typically invokes sufficient conditions for single
crossing to simplify the nonlinear programming problem. The standard suf-
ficiency condition for single crossing with discrete types is that
uF (f, w, d (t (·)) , 1, θ (·) , t (·))− uF (f, w, d (t (·)) , 0, θ (·) , t (·)) ;
be monotone in w, where the unobserved t (·) and θ (·) are functions of
founder type and the observed actions, (αF , f, w).
9
9Technically, it should also be monotonic in f , but this is automatic as f ∈ {ρ, 1}.
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We have been unable to show that such a condition generally holds in
this model. Intuitively, the difficulty arises because the founders’ hidden
information on type and action give them ‘countervailing incentives’, reasons
to represent themselves both as more and as less altruistic than they actually
are. A selfish founder has an incentive to encourage the donor to believe
her altruistic, and thus believe her to be setting a higher transfer share.
Similarly, an altruistic founder may have an incentive to encourage the donor
to believe her selfish, and thus believe that a large donation is necessary to
induce development spending. While the two types of founder differ only in
their degree of altruism, the possibility that their different hidden types may
lead them to have different hidden actions (whether the type of worker they
employ, or the transfers that they set) means that single-crossing may no
longer obtain: variations in w may, for example, induce discrete variations
in θ for any given αF .
10
Without single crossing, analytical results are uncommon. We may still
make some progress analytically by eliminating cases of θ-fraud in some cir-
cumstances.
Lemma 5. Neither founder type will be tempted to commit pure θ-fraud by
setting a transfer share above the donor’s expectation.
The proof, in Appendix A, has a straightforward intuition. Whatever
transfer share the founder sets, sending a signal that leads donors to un-
derestimate this share would yield not benefit but would be costly for two
reasons: it would earn her lower donations, and it might require her to make
higher wage payments. It follows from the lemma that pure θ-fraud can
only pose a threat to separation when an honest founder hires a high ability
worker. Otherwise, if such a founder hires an low ability worker, deviation
to a lower t becomes impossible without altering the wage.
The same argument allows us to establish that:
Lemma 6. Neither founder will be tempted to commit αθ-fraud by setting a
transfer share above that implied by the corresponding pure α-fraud.
The proof, in Appendix A, has the same intuition as its predecessor.
The above lemmata may reduce the forms of fraud against which a can-
didate separating equilibrium must guard. Table 1 displays the possibilities,
arranged by the worker types hired by honest founders. As these still seem
insufficient to establish single crossing, we now confine our analysis to a par-
ticular class of models.
10Maggi and Rodr´ıquez-Clare (1995) claim that general results do not exist for screening
games with countervailing incentives. We are not aware of general results for signalling
games.
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selfish founder’s choice
high ability low ability
altruist’s choice
high ability selfish: all selfish: α, αθ
altruist: all altruist: α, θ
low ability selfish: α, θ selfish: α
altruist: α, αθ altruist: α
Table 1: Potential fraud types by candidate separating equilibrium
4 A model with quadratic management costs
In this section we study a special case in which
g (x) = h (x) = 2
√
x. (27)
These specific functional forms satisfy the conditions imposed above on utility
functions. They also allow
−xg
′′ (x)
g′ (x)
= −xh
′′ (x)
h′ (x)
=
1
2
< 1;
which, by Lemma 2, guarantees increasing donations. Further, the donation
function reduces to
d (t) =
t
1 + t
. (28)
We also assume that
w = 1 and w¯ =
5
4
.
These ensure that wages remain positive over t ∈ [0, 1].
Finally, a full model also requires specification of the management costs.
We assume that c (x) = γx2, where γ is a positive constant. We investigate
three instances of γ, a high cost scenario (γ = 1
2
), a low cost scenario (γ = 1
10
),
and an intermediate cost scenario (γ = 1
4
).
Full details of the solutions are given in Appendix B: we concentrate here
on the key economic intuitions. When management costs are high, γ = 1
2
,
we find a unique separating equilibrium. It exhibits wage separation: both
founder types found FPs and hire high ability workers. Intuitively, the high
management costs make both forms of θ-fraud prohibitively expensive; pure
α-fraud is eliminated by the differences in the founders’ objective functions.
As all forms of fraud are eliminated, costly signals (like founding an NP,
or hiring a low ability worker as proof against fraud) are unnecessary, and
no founder establishes a non-profit. See Appendix B for a more detailed
discussion.
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Similarly, when management costs are low, γ = 1
10
, we again find a unique
separating equilibrium. It too exhibits wage separation: again, both founder
types found FPs, but now they hire low ability workers. If, instead, they
hired high ability workers, the low management costs would make θ-fraud
irresistible. Thus, only pure α-fraud is left, and the difference in founders’
objective functions makes this easy to overcome. Thus, costly signalling by
incorporating as a NP is not necessary, but founders hire low ability workers
as a commitment device against θ-fraud.
As founders only establish FPs in these cases, equilibria are insensitive to
the stringency of NP regulation, ρ. Thus, no issues arise for policy makers
in deciding how stringently to regulate NPs. When management costs are
intermediate, γ = 1
4
, there are separating equilibria which do involve organi-
zational separation. Thus, policy questions do arise. Further, the equilibrium
choices vary in ρ.
0 0.2 0.4 ρ ρ¯
0
0.5
1
1.5
uF
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
t
0 0.2 0.4 ρ ρ¯
Figure 2: Founders’ utility and transfer shares when c (x) = 1
4
x2
The left panel of Figure 2 depicts founders’ equilibrium utility as a func-
tion of NP regulatory stringency. Its upper curve corresponds to altruists,
the lower to selfish founders. The dashed vertical lines at ρ ≈ 0.57 and
ρ¯ ≈ 0.90 divide the diagram into three equilibrium regimes. The Figure’s
right panel depicts equilibrium transfer shares.
The rightmost region corresponds to loose NP regulation, thus ρ > ρ¯. In
this, both types found FPs and hire low ability workers. Thus, this too is
a case of wage separation. Organizational separation does not occur as NP
regulation is not yet sufficiently stringent for the signal to be meaningful.
This, in turn, leads both founders to set relatively low transfer shares (see the
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right panel of Figure 2) and hire low ability workers: a founder who wished
to hire high ability workers to efficiently manage large transfers would find
θ-fraud too tempting.
Now consider the middle region of the Figure, corresponding to more
stringent NP regulation, in which ρ ∈ [ρ, ρ¯]. In this, the altruist founds a
NP while the selfish founder establishes a FP. Thus, there is now organiza-
tional separation. Perhaps surprisingly, both hire high ability workers. For
the altruist, more stringent regulation increases the relative merits of devel-
opment work, and thus the value of the high ability worker. For the selfish
founder, her transfer share is sufficiently high that the high ability worker is
more efficient.
Finally, consider the leftmost region, corresponding to very stringent NP
regulation, ρ < ρ. The altruistic founder continues to run a NP with a high
ability worker. While the selfish founder continues to establish a FP, she
reverts to employing a low ability worker. She sets the same transfer share,
and earns the same utility as she did when ρ > ρ¯.
Under stringent regulation, it is clearly onerous to run a NP instead of a
FP. If, however, the altruistic founder were to found a FP she would succumb
to pure θ-fraud, and try to pass a low ability worker off as high ability. Even
founding a FP and honestly hiring a low ability worker would reduce her
utility.
Thus, as ρ→ 0, and the returns to consumption fall, the altruistic founder
continues to raise the transfer share. In the limit, she is able to set t close to
one: she consumes nothing herself, and t is high enough to drive her worker’s
wage down; see the right panel of Figure 2.
When the costs associated with low ability workers are intermediate,
therefore, policy makers can alter behaviour by choice of regulatory regime.
Figure 3 depicts total equilibrium transfers, t · d (t) , as a function of ρ. For
the selfish founder, both highly stringent and lax regulatory regimes lead to
the same overall transfers. As the founder hires low ability workers in these
cases, these are lower than the overall transfers in the intermediate regime,
with the high ability worker.
Once the regulatory regime is sufficiently strict for the altruistic founder
to establish a NP, her overall transfers continue to rise as the regime becomes
stricter.
Thus, a policy maker interested in maximising overall transfers must as-
sess the likelihood of the unknown founder being altruistic relative to her
being selfish. If the policy maker thinks that altruists dominate, a very strict
regime is called for. On the other hand, if the policy maker thinks that selfish
founders are more likely, setting ρ just above ρ is optimal: it induces maximal
transfers from the (expected) selfish founder but, should the founder turn out
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Figure 3: Total transfers when c (x) = 1
4
x2
to be altruistic, still induces higher transfers than a more lax regime would.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we explore the idea that charitable organizations act like banks
to transfer funds between providers of funds and those who have worthwhile
projects that need funds. However, unlike banks, charities cannot signal to
donors the quality of the projects they fund by providing a financial return.
Instead, they can use the salary paid to employees (or other indicators such
as spending on overheads) as a signal to donors of the quality of the work
that employees undertake, where quality is understood in terms of the over-
all proportion of the organization’s portfolio that is directed to development
projects. An employee would accept a job at a lower wage than that avail-
able in the outside labor market only if the job afforded genuine altruistic
compensation. The donor can then infer that the organization is doing gen-
uinely good work. Furthermore, when founders are altruistic, the quality of
the work done will be higher in a NP firm than in a FP.
It is important to note, however, that in this model, establishing a not-for-
profit organization is of no value purely for solving moral hazard problems. It
is true that, provided founders are altruistic, they undertake higher levels of
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development work under not-for-profit status. However, the cost to them of
such status outweighs the pure commitment value. Where NP status really
comes into its own, however, is in solving the adverse selection problem asso-
ciated with founder and worker types. In a world in which founders cannot all
be assumed to be altruistic and in which it may be hard to know the ability
of workers in advance, this seems to us to be an important consideration.
The adverse selection problem is as follows: inferring the quality of the
work done by the organization from the wage offered to its employees may be
possible only if the ability of the employees is known - a given low wage may
result from a high ability worker and high quality work, or a low ability worker
and low quality work. The donor also needs to be sure, in order to infer the
quality of the work done from the salary, that he has correctly inferred the
founder’s type (where this is not directly observable). We have shown that
the nature of the equilibria in which such inferences are possible depends on
two things: the costs associated with employing low-ability workers, and the
strictness of regulation of not-for-profit firms. When the costs of low-ability
workers are either very low or very high, both types of founders hire the same
type of worker, and donors can simply infer the work of the organization from
the wage without fear of misrepresentation in equilibrium. Consequently
there is no need for founders to engage in the costly signal of incorporating
as a not-for-profit firm. However, intermediate costs make misrepresentation
of worker type a more realistic concern, and at this point incorporation as a
not-for-profit becomes a valuable signal for altruistic founders. However, the
nature of the equilibrium depends on the strictness of NP regulation. When
NP regulation is loose, founders cannot meaningfully signal by incorporating
as NPs. Thus, the separating equilibrium for high values of ρ displays wage
rather than organizational separation. Further, the ease with which θ-fraud
could be committed were they to hire high ability workers forces them, in
equilibrium, to hire low ability workers. As NP regulation becomes stricter,
organizational separation becomes meaningful, and is taken advantage of by
altruistic founders, who found NPs. Doing so further induces them to hire
high ability workers, thus aiming to derive their utility from good works
rather than perks. When NP regulation is of intermediate strictness, the
selfish founder also hires a high ability worker. Were she to do this when
NP regulation was very strict, however, the altruistic founder would prefer
to pretend to be selfish; thus, under very strict regulation, the selfish founder
reverts to hiring an low ability worker.
Our approach to the signalling problem is nevertheless fairly special: we
assume, to simplify the problem, that donors have no other ways to discover
whether founders have misled them. In reality, of course, other instruments
are available, including audits, press and media coverage, and direct involve-
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ment on the part of donors. Unless such monitoring instruments work per-
fectly there may still be a role for the kind of signalling mechanism we have
described, but the interaction of monitoring and signalling will be subtle. In-
cluding such monitoring instruments into a more complete model of agency
behaviour is an interesting challenge for future work.
A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Differentiating the objective function implicitly defines a
unique maximum for all t ∈ [0, 1]:
g′ (1− d)− h′ (d · t) t = 0. (29)
When t = 0, the unique solution is d (0) = 0: the monotonicity of g (·)
prevents an interior d from solving g′ (1− d) = 0.
When t > 0, this has a unique solution in d ∈ (0, 1): the utility function is
continuously differentiable, yielding infinite marginal utility in consumption
at d = 1 and in altruism at d = 0. Uniqueness follows from the monotonicity
of g (·) and h (·) and their opposing arguments.
Finally, implicit differentiation of equation 29 yields
d′ (t) = −h
′′ (d · t) d · t+ h′ (d · t)
h′′ (d · t) t2 + g′′ (1− d) . (30)
At t = 0, this reduces to − h′(0)
g′′(1) =∞.
Proof of Lemma 2. As the denominator of equation 30 is negative, a positive
sign overall depends on a positive numerator. The condition is equivalent to
this.
Proof of Lemma 3. Proving the lemma reduces to proving that
δ (t) ≡ c ((1 + t) d)− (w (1, 0, t)− w (1, 1, t)) ;
has a single root in t ∈ [0, 1]. By equation 9 and c (0) = 0, δ (0) = w− w¯ < 0.
By assumption 13, δ (1) > 0. As c′ (·) > 0, it suffices that w (1, 0, t)−w (1, 1, t)
be (weakly) monotonically decreasing in t.
When t is high enough that w (1, 0, t) = w (1, 1, t) = 0, this holds. When
only w (1, 1, t) = 0 this also holds as w (1, 0, t) is declining towards zero.
Finally, when both w (1, 0, t) and w (1, 1, t) are positive, differentiation
yields
δ′ (t) = h′ (t)
[
1
g′ (g (w¯)− h (t)) −
1
g′ (g (w)− h (t))
]
.
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When the bracketed term containing the fractions is positive, the result fol-
lows. This is now established:
w¯ > w ⇒ 0 < g′ (g (w¯)− h (t)) < g′ (g (w)− h (t)) .
The reciprocal of this final term yields the result.
Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose that the selfish founder’s maximand is concave
in t. It therefore has a unique maximum at t∗0. This is necessarily positive
as, otherwise, she receives no donation: the marginal donation and, thus, her
marginal utility are infinite at t = 0.
The altruistic founder’s first order condition adds
h′ (d · t) [d′ (t) + d] ; (31)
to that of the selfish founder. As this is always positive, the altruist’s mar-
ginal utility is positive at t∗0. Under concavity, t can only be reduced to zero
by increasing to some t∗1 > t
∗
0. Finally, as t
∗
1 = 1 leaves k = 0, marginal
disutility of t at that point is infinite. Thus, t∗1 < 1.
Now consider situations in which the selfish founder’s maximand is not
concave. If there remains a unique local maximum, the argument above goes
through. If there are multiple local maxima, index them, starting with the
leftmost. There are as many local maxima for the altruistic founder as there
are for the selfish: the addition of the increasing, concave function increases
the value of t at each stationary point; none of them are forced beyond t = 1
due to the infinite disutility experienced by the founder there.
If the addition of the altruism function does not change which local max-
imum is the global maximum, then the result is established. If it does, then
the new maximum cannot correspond to a stationary point with a lower in-
dex number: the altruistic objective function adds an increasing function to
its selfish counterpart. This establishes the result.
Proof of Theorem 2. As h (·) is not a function of f , the envelope theorem
only requires that we consider
∂2g (·)
∂t∂ρ
=
{
−d+ (1− t) d′ (t)− c′ (·) [d+ (1 + t) d′ (t)] + h
′ (t)
g′ (·)
}
× [g′ (ρk) + g′′ (ρk) ρk] . (32)
which must be negative for the theorem to hold. In equilibrium, the first
bracketed term is negative: this must offset the positive derivative in the h
function. The terms in the second bracket are positive and negative, respec-
tively. The stated condition ensures increasing differences so that t∗1 decreases
in ρ when f = ρ.
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Proof of Lemma 5. Consider a candidate separating equilibrium in which one
of the founder types sets
(
f¯ , t¯, θ¯
)
. Let
(
f¯ , t˜, θ˜
)
be an instance of pure θ-fraud
(so that θ˜ 6= θ¯) with upward deviation (so that t˜ > t¯). Finally, suppose that
this deviation is preferable to honesty:
g
(
f¯
[
(1− t¯) d (t¯)− c (θ¯ (1 + t¯) d (t¯))− w (1, θ¯, t¯)])+ αFh (d (t¯) t¯)
≤g
(
f¯
[(
1− t˜) d (t¯)− c(θ˜ (1 + t˜) d (t¯))− w (1, θ¯, t¯)])+ αFh (d (t¯) t˜) .
If the founder set t˜ but, instead of engaging in θ-fraud, honestly signalled
wages, her utility would be:
g
(
f¯
[(
1− t˜) d (t˜)− c(θ˜ (1 + t˜) d (t˜))− w (1, θ˜, t˜)])+ αFh (d (t˜) t˜) .
As d (·) is an increasing function, the altruism utility in this expression
cannot be less than that under θ-fraud. By this same argument, the first
term in the g (·) function is now greater as well. Further, the assumption
that c′ (2) < 1 ensures that additional administrative costs (if θ˜ = 1) cannot
outweigh additional donations. Finally, honest signalling lowers the wage
bill.
Thus, if there is a profitable instance of θ-fraud involving upward devia-
tion to t˜ > t¯ it, in turn, is outperformed by honest signalling at t˜. Thus, both
the candidate t¯ and upward deviations involving pure θ-fraud may be elim-
inated: the first does not maximise the honest founder’s utility; the second
produces a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 6. Consider honest behaviour, (f0, t0, θ0) by a selfish founder
that is outperformed by an upward deviation to
(
f1, tˆ0, θˆ0
)
where θˆ0 6= θ1
and tˆ0 > t1:
f0 [(1− t0) d (t0)− c (θ0 (1 + t0) d (t0))− w (1, θ0, t0)]
≤f1
[(
1− tˆ0
)
d (t1)− c
(
θˆ0
(
1 + tˆ0
)
d (t1)
)
− w (1, θ1, t1)
]
.
Honest signalling with this transfer share would yield
f1
[(
1− tˆ0
)
d
(
tˆ0
)− c(θˆ0 (1 + tˆ0) d (tˆ0))− w (1, θˆ0, tˆ0)] ;
which, as in Lemma 5, outperforms this form of αθ-fraud.
The same argument applies to altruistic founders. In their case, the
honest behaviour is (f1, t1, θ1) while the putatively superior upward deviation
is to
(
f0, tˆ1, θˆ1
)
where θˆ1 6= θ0 and tˆ1 > t0.
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B Quadratic management costs
Before considering particular values of γ we discuss the method for analysing
these models. Analysis requires determination of founders’ optimal honest
behaviour, as well as their optimal deviations. One of the founders’ choice
variables, the transfer share, is continuous. The other two, organizational
form and worker ability, are binary. Thus, founders first maximise by choice
of transfer share, holding their binary choice variables constant. Then, they
compare the maximised values for different combination of the binary vari-
ables. Nevertheless, not all optimal transfer shares depend on both of the
binary variables.
For the reasons outlined in Theorem 1, the honest selfish founder’s op-
timal transfer share is independent of organizational form; as it depends on
the worker’s ability, we write t0 (θ0). The honest altruistic founder’s optimal
transfer share depends on both of these, so that t1 (f1, θ1).
The selfish founder’s optimal transfer share under pure θ-fraud satisfies
equation 16. As shown in Table 1, the selfish founder only need guard against
this when θ0 = 0. Thus, as the selfish founder seeks to minimise the transfer
share, her optimal deviation is:
t˜0 (t0) = max
{
0, h−1 (h (t0) + g (w)− g (w¯))
}
.
Similarly, as shown in Table 1, the selfish founder only need guard against
αθ-fraud when θ1 = 0. In these cases the optimal fraud sets:
tˆ0 (f1, θ1) = max
{
0, h−1 (h (t1 (f1, θ1)) + g (w)− g (w¯))
}
.
Now consider the altruistic founder’s optimal pure θ-fraud. Again, as
shown in Table 1, this is only a threat when θ1 = 0. Unlike the selfish
founder, however, the altruistic founder derives utility from transfers. Thus,
the optimal deviation maximises the founder’s objective function when θ1 =
0: denote this deviation by t˜1 (f1) as it depends on organizational form choice.
Finally, consider the altruistic founder’s optimal αθ-fraud. As, by Table
1, this form of fraud is only threatening when θ0 = 0, we write the value of t
that maximises the founder’s objective function under this form of fraud as
tˆ1 (f0).
B.1 High management costs
In the high cost scenario, γ = 1
2
. This satisfies the conditions on cost func-
tions imposed above, except inequality 12: here c′ (2) = 2 > 1. The in-
equality was only used in lemmata 5 and 6, which eliminated certain forms
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of fraud when at least one of the founders hired an low ability worker. We
show, below, that the equilibrium in this model involves both founders hiring
high ability workers; thus, violating this condition is not of consequence.
We therefore plot founders’ returns as the stringency of non-profit regula-
tion, ρ, varies.11 Doing so reveals an equilibrium in which both founder types
found FPs and hire high ability workers for all levels of non-profit regulation,
ρ - a wage separating equilibrium. Founders’ ensuing payoffs are displayed
in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Founders’ utility when c (x) = 1
2
x2, both found FPs and hire high
ability workers
The figure’s upper four lines depict the altruist’s utility under honesty
(the solid line) and all three forms of fraud (pure α, pure θ and αθ, in
decreasing order of lucrativeness). The lower two lines depict the selfish
founder’s utility under honesty (the solid line) and α-fraud: the costs of low
ability are such that the two forms of θ-fraud earn the selfish founder negative
utility. (The fraudulent altruistic also does least well out of the forms of θ-
fraud.) All the lines are invariant in the stringency of non-profit regulation,
ρ, as no non-profits are founded.
11The Maple code used to generate payoffs under all scenarios is available at
www.economics.bham.ac.uk/rowat/research/0507rs-maple.zip.
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The figure shows that both founder types prefer honest behaviour for
any value of ρ. For this to be an equilibrium, though, it must be that
both founder types are maximising by their choice of organizational form
and worker ability: the figure only depicts f0 = f1 = 1 and θ0 = θ1 = 0.
Rather than display all permutations, we merely illustrate payoffs in the
scenario reached if the altruistic founder chooses, instead, to found a NP.
This is depicted in Figure 5. Thus, when the altruistic founder does not
engage in any form of α-fraud, thus founding a NP, her utility decreases
as NP regulation becomes more stringent. Only when the selfish founder
engages in α-fraud does her utility decrease in ρ. Most importantly, the
altruistic founder receives lower utility by founding a NP. Thus, this is not
an equilibrium. Exploring all other combinations of worker abilities and
organizational forms shows that neither founder type has an incentive to
deviate from founder a FP and hiring a high ability worker.
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Figure 5: Founders’ utility when c (x) = 1
2
x2, only selfish founds FP; both
hire high ability workers
B.2 Low management costs
Now set γ = 1
10
. Inequality 12 is now satisfied. Figure 6 shows founders’
utility under the wage separating equilibrium.
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Figure 6: Founders’ utility when c (x) = 1
10
x2, both found FPs and hire low
ability
B.3 Moderate management costs
Low let γ = 1
4
. Thus, inequality 12 is again satisfied.
The left panel of Figure 7 shows a separating equilibrium when ρ is high:
both founders found FPs, both hire low ability workers and both prefer hon-
esty (the solid lines) to pure α-fraud, the only deviation not eliminated by
lemmata 5 and 6. The altruistic founder prefers this to founding a NP (with
either type of worker).
To see why the above is an equilibrium, note that the altruistic founder
could earn a higher payoff by hiring a high ability worker, as depicted in the
right panel of the figure. Intuitively, a high ability worker would let her set
a higher transfer share, earning a larger donation. This, however, is not a
separating equilibrium as it opens up new possibilities of fraud: upon hiring
a high ability worker, she would do even better to engage in pure θ-fraud
(the top dotted line), pretending to have hired a high ability worker while
actually hiring an low ability one. As the donor understands this, he knows
that θ˜1 = 1 and t˜1 < t1 and make a donation accordingly. When, however,
the donor correctly infers that the altruistic founder has hired an low ability
worker, the altruistic founder’s optimal transfer is, by definition, t1.
Even the selfish founder would earn greater utility by hiring a high ability
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Figure 7: Founders’ utility when c (x) = 1
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x2, both found FP
worker. However, if she did, the altruistic founder’s returns to pure α-fraud
would exceed her returns to honesty, and the separating equilibrium would
fail to exist.
For ρ ∈ [ρ, ρ¯], Figure 8 illustrates the temptations facing both founder
types: the dotted curve rising above the altruist’s honesty curve as ρ ap-
proaches one is that associated with pure θ-fraud, while that exceeding hon-
esty as ρ decreases is that associated with pure α-fraud.
While each founder prefers to deviate from this arrangement, neither can
do so in a way that retains separation. Thus, any deviation will lead the
donor to suspect fraud, leaving the founder worse off.
Finally, when NP regulation becomes very stringent, the objective func-
tion and IC constraints are illustrated by Figure 9.
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